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Abstract
The channels through which the real exchange rate influences urban/rural per capita real
income inequality are analyzed using yearly data for 28 Chinese provinces. Due to the higher
share of tradable goods produced in urban than rural areas, the real depreciation of the
Chinese currency raised the urban bias, contrary to the effect usually expected. This rise was,
however, mitigated because of the impact of the exchange rate on the urban/rural consumer
price ratio, real public wages, and the ratio of industrial/agricultural protection rates. It
disappeared for coastal provinces due to the strong development of outward-oriented rural
industrial activities.
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Résumé
Les canaux par lesquels le taux de change réel influence l’inégalité des revenus réels per tête
entre les villes et la campagne sont analysés à partir des données annuelles de 28 provinces
chinoises. A cause de la part plus importante de la production de biens échangeables
internationalement en ville qu’à la campagne, la dépréciation réelle de la monnaie chinoise a
accru le biais urbain, contrairement à ce qui est habituellement attendu. Cette hausse du biais
urbain a cependant été atténuée par l’impact du taux de change sur le ratio des prix à la
consommation en ville et à la campagne, sur les salaires de la fonction publique et sur le ratio
des taux de protection des biens industriels et agricoles. Elle n’existe pas dans les provinces
côtières à cause du développement de l’industrie rurale.
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1- Introduction
It has often been argued that overvaluation of domestic currencies in developing countries
tends to penalize farmers, and that real depreciation should therefore be beneficial to the latter
1. The
devaluation which accompanied stabilization and liberalization programs pursued by developing
countries since the beginning of the 1980s, aimed primarily at restoring the balance of payments
equilibrium. A complementary motive for devaluation has sometimes been to reduce the “urban bias”
inherent to development strategies of many developing countries.
Studies on the effects of the exchange rate policy of developing countries principally focus on
the general price level, production or the balance of payments, or consider only a particular aspect of
income distribution, such as the evolution of real wages or profit-wage sharing
2. However, only a few
studies have investigated the issue of the relationship between the evolution of the exchange rate and
the distribution of urban and rural incomes.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the exchange rate policy of China has been very active,
which has resulted in a substantial real depreciation of the Chinese currency (Guillaumont Jeanneney S.
and Hua P., 1996). The fact that China publishes annual series of urban and rural incomes at provincial
level provides an especially relevant case for assessing the relationship between the real exchange rate
and the geographical distribution of incomes. This study is all the more interesting as both urban/rural
and provincial income disparities are the main source of China’s income inequality (World Bank, 1997).
This paper comprises two sections. The following section examines the different phases of the
exchange rate policy of China and the corresponding evolution of the ratio of urban/rural incomes per
capita. It appears that the income inequality between urban and rural areas does not move identically in
the two geographical zones, namely inland and coastal areas, and therefore that the real depreciation of
the Chinese currency might have raised the urban bias more in the former than in the latter. This
                                                                
1 See, for instance, the World Bank analysis on the reasons for agricultural stagnation in Africa in the early
1980s (World Bank, 1981), and more generally the contributions of Morrisson (1991), Bourguignon and
Morrisson (1992), Guillaumont P. (1993) and Minot (1998).
2 See for instance Alejandro (1963), Twomey (1983), Edwards (1989), Agenor & Montiel (1996). See also the
contributions of Knight (1976) and Morrisson (1991) which are closer to our analysis.3
divergence is in keeping with the ambiguous theoretical predictions of the impact of exchange rate
variation on income distribution. Several assumptions are then presented to analyze certain channels
through which exchange rate variations may have influenced urban/rural per capita income inequality in
China, and so to explain the divergence between inland and coastal provinces. The last section presents
the econometric results obtained from a panel analysis.
2. Relationship between the real exchange rate and the geographical distribution of
income: stylized facts and main assumptions
2.1. The various phases of China’s exchange rate policy
The exchange rate policy pursued by China since the beginning of the liberalization program
has been quite complex, as, from 1981 to 1993, it involved a double exchange rate regime, whose
nature has, moreover, changed over time. Since 1979, planned imports have been supported by priority
foreign exchange allowances, while some non-planned imports have been financed either by foreign
capital or through a system of foreign exchange retention. The latter, which has been progressively
expanded, allows enterprises to use a part of foreign exchange earnings derived from exports to
finance their own imports or to sell them at an internal settlement rate, which as of 1981 was higher
than the commercial rate applied to planned imports. Previously, foreign exchange earnings had to be
entirely remitted to the central government. In 1985, the internal rate became a market price, whereas
the commercial rate was replaced by an official rate.
Until their unification in January 1994, the differential between the two rates (namely, between
the commercial rate and the internal rate for the 1981-1984 period, and then between the official rate
and the free market rate for the 1985-1993 period) has fluctuated between 10% and 70%. Both rates
have strongly depreciated. In contrast, the unified exchange rate, now subject to a controlled floating
regime, only slightly depreciated (compared to the dollar) in 1994 and then slightly appreciated in 1995
and 1996. These various changes explain the highly contrasted evolution of China’s real exchange rate
over time.4
The size of the variation in the real value of the Chinese currency (the Renminbi) can be
inferred from the evolution of a real effective exchange rate, being calculated as the weighted
geometric average of real exchange rate indexes of the Renminbi relative to the currencies of China’s
main trading partners. Weights are modified each year (Paasche index) so as to allow for the rapid
change in the geographical structure of Chinese foreign trade over the period. To calculate the real
exchange rate, consumer prices are used for each province of China as well as for its trading partners;
exchange rates are computed as the weighted average of the two exchange rates simultaneously used
in China; the weighting of the two rates being based on the retention rate of exports. An increase in the
effective exchange rate index corresponds to a depreciation.
After a strong rise of 106 % in 1981 due to the introduction of the internal rate, the real
effective exchange rates declined (so appreciated) by 11% from 1981 to 1985. The depreciation of the
currency appeared again from 1985 to 1993, since the real effective exchange rates increased by
127%. Furthermore, this depreciation, pertaining to exports of industrial products, was stronger since,
during the double exchange rate regime, the retention rate of foreign exchange was higher for industrial
goods than for agricultural goods. From 1993 to 1996, with the unification of exchange rates, the real
effective exchange rate appreciated for the second time by 29% (Figure 1).
2.2. The evolution of geographical income distribution
Urban income refers here to the disposable income of urban households which can be used for
daily expenses, i.e. total income minus income tax, property tax and other current transfers. Rural
income, defined as the net income of rural households, refers to the total income of the rural households
net of expenses for productive operations, taxes and payments to collective units
3. Real incomes are
obtained by deflating the consumer prices in urban areas and rural areas respectively (base
                                                                
3 We may recall that the relative evolution of urban and rural incomes does not reflect the relative evolution of
living standards, since the calculation of incomes does not include the indirect (in kind) incomes derived from
public services (education, health and housing), and because the evaluation of the auto-consumption of the
peasants is questionable (Cai, 1998).5
1990=100)
4. One specificity of China during the 1982-1996 period is that the rural revenue composition
changed from dominantly agricultural revenue to a revenue deriving both from agriculture and industry,
as the contribution of the latter to per capita rural revenues passed from 12 % in 1982 to 31 % in 1996.
This change is much more marked in coastal than inland provinces due to the uneven distribution of
outward-oriented rural industry activities.
Figure 1 permits us to compare the evolution of the real effective exchange rate with the
evolution of the ratio of urban to rural real per capita incomes. It shows that during the first phase of
reforms from 1982 to 1985, when prices of goods were still largely administered and the real exchange
rate registered only a slight appreciation, the discrepancy between urban and rural incomes, both
expressed in 1990 prices, slightly declined. On the contrary, from 1985 to 1993, while the Chinese
economy shifted towards a market economy and the real effective exchange rate strongly depreciated,
the inequality between urban and rural incomes widened again, as a result of a drastic slowdown in the
growth rate of rural income, with the latter falling to 1.8% per year whereas the growth rate of urban
income remained stable (5.7% per year). Hence, the ratio of urban to rural incomes, measured at
constant prices, reached 2.36 in 1994, compared to 1.76 in 1985. After 1993, in a context of exchange
                                                                
4 Retail prices for rural areas are used for the 1982-1984 period, since consumer price indexes were not available for
this period.
Figure 1 Evolution of the real effective exchange rate






















































































rate unification, the real effective exchange rate appreciated, and income inequality again began to
lessen, subsequent to the high growth rate of rural incomes (10.1% compared to 5.6% in urban areas).
 Sources :Quanguo Gesheng Zizhiqu Zhixiashi Lishi Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1989 (China’s Provincial Statistics,
1949-1989), China regional Economy, A Profile of 17 years of Reform and Opening Up and China Statistical
Yearbook 1997, p.293. 
If we now consider the evolution of the ratio of urban to rural real per capita incomes, no
longer for the whole country, but for eleven coastal provinces and seventeen inland provinces
respectively
5, it appears that there are some differences in urban/rural income inequality between
inland and coastal provinces (Figure 2). The rise in the ratio of urban to rural incomes is indeed more
pronounced for inland provinces than for coastal provinces. This result could not be expected a priori.
Indeed, the share of foreign direct investments in total investment is higher in coastal provinces
compared to inland provinces, and these investments are also more concentrated in industry, which
should a priori be of benefit to urban areas. This result suggests that the specialization differential
between coastal and inland provinces, with activities of the former being more largely outward-
oriented, is more salient in rural areas than in urban areas.
                                                                
5 Ratios of urban to rural real incomes for coastal and inland provinces are calculated as the arithmetic average of
the ratio of urban to rural real incomes per capita of each province in coastal and inland areas. The independent
region of Tibet and the Hainan province (formed in 1988), are excluded due to statistical limitations. Data
pertaining to Guangdong were corrected by excluding the data relative to Hainan before 1988.
Figure 2 Evolution of urban/rural real income per capita 























































2.3. Main assumptions about the relationship between the real effective exchange rate and
urban/rural income inequality
The real effective exchange rate, of which the evolution has already been presented, may be
considered as a proxy for the relative price of internationally tradable goods. A rise in the latter (or a
real depreciation) exerts an effect on per capita income which is all the more favorable as agents
produce a larger share and consume a smaller share of tradable goods. It will therefore be translated
as a change in urban/rural income inequality, since urban and rural households do not produce and
consume the same proportion of tradable goods.
In China, as in other developing countries, the urban zones produce chiefly industrial goods and
services whereas rural zones produce agricultural goods. Although services are essentially non-
tradable, it seems reasonable in the case of China to assume that urban zones produce a higher
proportion of tradable goods compared to the rural zones. Indeed, due to the auto-sufficiency policy
pursued by Chinese authorities, the major part of agricultural production is devoted to auto-consumption
and to the protected domestic market. The share of auto-consumption in the daily consumption
expenditure was 59 % in 1978 and still 34 % in 1995
6. Agricultural products bought by the government
are mainly for the consumption of urban zones. Farmers have been progressively allowed to sell the
residual production (i.e. the production after compulsory deliveries and auto-consumption) on the
domestic market. Exports and imports of agricultural products are still largely controlled by the
government.
A specific feature of China has been the development of rural industry. The weak industrial
activities in the rural zones of inland provinces actually appear mainly oriented towards the domestic
market. The assumption relative to a lower ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods in rural than in urban
productions may, however, be mitigated for coastal provinces. In fact, rural industrial activities have
been considerably concentrated in coastal areas, due to low per capita land ratios, dense populations,
better infrastructure and the potential for rural enterprises to build profitable links with existing8
industries (Findlay, et al. 1992). The difference in the development of rural enterprises is also due to
the different economic structure which originated from the strategy of heavy industry development.
The part of the state economy, dominated by heavy industries and located in urban zones, is much more
important in inland provinces than in coastal provinces. The latter have good light industry bases which
are much more easily transferred to rural zones which already have some industrial activities. This
transfer is facilitated by their greater proximity to urban centers than in inland zones. The rural
enterprises in coastal provinces are furthermore highly export-oriented, since they enjoy natural
advantages due to the proximity of foreign markets. The impact of such advantages on growth has
been strengthened by the opening-up policy, with the latter itself being supported by the depreciation of
the real exchange rate. On the contrary, the inland provinces have been defavored by the policy of the
central government which restricted direct foreign investment in strategic sectors using key raw
materials in which the inland provinces had a comparative advantage (Huang, 1996). In addition,
coastal rural areas have benefited from preferential measures with respect to credit policy as well as to
pilot reforms in the field of economic and trade liberalization. Industrial production and exports of rural
enterprises derived from coastal provinces represent 60 % and 88 % respectively. Simultaneously, the
strong economic growth in coastal provinces, as well as the experimental reforms in the service sector
in urban coastal provinces, stimulates the development of service activities (non-tradable goods, chiefly
in urban areas), faster than in inland provinces. Thus, in coastal provinces, rural agents may produce
roughly the same proportion of internationally tradable goods as urban agents.
It is also likely that the households of rural zones consume a larger proportion of non-tradable
goods (partly because of auto-consumption) compared to urban households, and that the depreciation of
the real exchange rate will entail a smaller rise in consumer prices in the rural zone compared to
consumer prices in the urban zone. This assumption seems relevant in the case of China in view of the
evolution of the ratio of prices in the two zones. Indeed, over the whole period analyzed here, and
except for the years 1989 and 1990, consumer prices rose faster in urban areas than in rural areas. The
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 China Economic Systems Reform Yearbook 1996, p260.9
ratio of consumer prices in urban areas to consumer prices in rural areas increased by 20% between
1982 and 1996. This diverging evolution of prices contributed to the reduction of the inequality between
real incomes in urban and rural areas.
An other factor to consider is the nature of incomes in each zone. In urban zones, workers are
mainly civil servants or wage-earners in state owned and collective units, or to a smaller extent, in
private firms. On the contrary, with the general adoption of the household responsibility system
7, most
farmers were paid according to their production. That is why wage policy may have been an important
factor of urban/rural income inequality. Prior to the reforms, the Chinese government pursued a low-
wage policy in the public sector in order to have a cheap labor force. It has, since then, tried to
introduce a wage system linking wage levels to productivity. Thus, bonuses and complementary wages
have been introduced; fixed wages were replaced by floating wages. However, this bonus system has
actually worked as a means to compensate for inflation and poor labor standards rather than as an
effective means to reward individual performance. The pressure of allocating bonuses on an equal
basis has strongly contributed to the increase in wages in urban areas (Howell, 1997). A relevant
question is thus to know if the depreciation of the real exchange rate has been accompanied by a
decline in real wages or has not, due to wage resistance relative to an implicit inflation indexed
mechanism.
On the other hand, with the development of rural industry, some of the rural workers became
wage-earners in township and village enterprises, but also in private firms. The number of these wage-
earners passed from 9 % in 1982 to 30 % in 1996, and they are much more important in coastal (13%
in 1982 and 43 % in 1996) than inland provinces (6% in 1982 and 23 % in 1996). In many developing
countries, there was a tendency for real agricultural wages to decline after devaluation more than real
manufacturing wages (Edwards, 1989). Does China follow the same tendency for rural manufacturing
                                                                
7 The agricultural household responsibility system was initiated in 1978 by farmers in the Anhui province. The
system directly linked agricultural household compensation to production. Previously, farmers were compensated
on an equable basis, depending on the time spent on the farm. Owing to the strong incentives provided by the
responsibility system, farmers have experienced very good performances. The system has been rapidly adopted
in many other provinces, though it was only acknowledged by the government as a national policy in 1983.10
wages vis-à-vis urban wages, and which would be detrimental to the relative rural incomes? How does
the uneven distribution of the employees in township and villages enterprises influence the geographical
urban/rural incomes ?
Finally, we may recall that in many developing countries exchange rate depreciation has given
an opportunity to the government to decrease the protection of domestic activities against foreign
competitors. Given that in China, prior to the reforms, the prices of agricultural products were fixed at a
low level to finance industrialization which was highly subsidized (Guo et al., 1993; Sheng, 1996), we
may expect that, with the depreciation of the exchange rate, the protection of industry declined faster
than the protection of agriculture, contributing to a reduction in urban/rural inequality. This decline in the
ratio of industry/agriculture protection rates may be stronger in coastal provinces than in inland
provinces, because the former work in a better market environment (Li, 1999); on the contrary, during
this reform period where the role of the market was expanding, the inland provinces suffered from the
remaining low state price controls of the key raw materials which they supplied to producers in other
provicnes (Hare et al., 1999).
3. Econometric analysis
The model is estimated, using a non-balanced yearly panel data of 28 provinces for the 1982-
1996 period during which China practiced a very active exchange rate policy
8. Some regressions for
the 1985-1996 period are estimated due to the unavailability of several independent control variables
before 1985. All Chinese annual statistics are from  Quanguo  Gesheng  Zizhiqu  Zhixiashi  Lishi
Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1989 (China’s Provincial Statistics, 1949-1989),  China Regional
Economy, A profile of 17 Years of Reform and Opening Up, Rural Statistical Yearbook of China
and Zhongguo Xiangzhen Qiye Nianjian (Township and Village enterprises Yearbook of China).
The official exchange rate and the importance of trade between China and its main trade partners are
                                                                
8 The stationarity of the variables was tested at the national level in a more extended paper. The results show that
the urban/rural per capita income inequality and the real effective exchange rate turned out stationary in levels;
and furthermore the model is balanced.11
provided by the IMF International Financial Statistics, and  Direction of Trade respectively. The
internal settlement rate is calculated in Guillaumont Jeanneney S. and Hua P. (1996), as well as the
retention rate of exports; while the free market rates of Renminbi are from World Bank (1994) and
China Monthly Statistics. All variables are converted into indexes (100=1990) and expressed in
logarithms.
The panel procedure has the advantage of allowing the impact of real exchange rate variation on
urban/rural inequality to be different according to the location (coastal and inland) of the provinces
according to our assumption. In order to capture the specificity of coastal provinces, the real effective
exchange rate is multiplied by a dummy variable (m) which takes the value 1 for coastal provinces and
0 for inland provinces. This enables us to shed light on the differential impact of the real exchange rate,
with respect to province location. The expected sign of the dummy (m) is negative.
3.1. The choice and calculation of control variables
In order to estimate the impact of the real exchange rate on the ratio of real per capita incomes
in urban and rural zones (I), we introduce three kinds of control variables in the regressions.
First, to asses the direction of the relationship between the real effective exchange rate and
urban/rural income inequality, some indicators are introduced into the model, reflecting the policy
measures which specifically or differently affected rural or urban incomes, such as the gradual
adoption of the household responsibility system for the farmers
9 (r) which concerns only the rural
sector, and wage policy in the public sector which concerns mainly the urban sector (wu). As the public
real wages themselves appear to be affected by the exchange rate policy, they are first purged of the
impact of real exchange rate, and then introduced as an independent variable in the regressions. The
purged value explains the part of the real public wages not influenced by the real exchange rate
variations. It thus represents the exogenous government wage policy in the public sector. On the other
                                                                
9 The data for the 1978-1987 period are provided by Lin, 1988; those for the 1988-1996 are supposed to be the
same as those for 1987.12
hand, the ratio of urban wages compared to rural wages in township and village enterprises
10 (w) is
introduced to capture the impact of the different wage policies in urban and rural areas after having
verified that this ratio is not influenced by the real exchange rate.
Second, we already previously mentioned that the real exchange rate has an impact on
urban/rural income inequality because it is an indicator of the relative price of tradable goods. Thus,
assessing the effect of the variation in the real effective exchange rate on the inequality of incomes per
capita between urban and rural areas requires the introduction of variables used to control for the
relative evolution of the international price of industrial and agricultural goods which are mainly
produced in each zone respectively (z)
11, as well as for the protection policy pertaining to them
12 (p)
(Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 1991). Protection policy itself is often influenced by exchange
rate policy. As this relationship is confirmed, the relative protection variable is purged of the impact of
real exchange rate. The purged variable represents the relative protection policies in industrial and
agricultural sectors independent of the exchange rate.
Third, there are variables which are usually very important in explaining income inequality, such
as the education level and the demographic characteristics of households. In China, there is a strong
inequality of the average education level between urban and rural areas which should contribute to
explaining the inequality of per capita incomes between the two areas. The education variable used
here is the ratio of urban/rural population receiving only primary education (e). The  permanent
inventor method is applied to estimate the population receiving only primary education, thanks to the
1982 census (Démurger, 1998). The availability of education data for each province since 1988
indicating the rural population receiving only primary education allows us then to calculate the urban
                                                                
10 The data for agricultural wages does exist in China.
11  Prices of industrial goods correspond to the unit export value of manufactured products (in dollars) for
developing countries, obtained from the  International Trade Statistics Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics of the United Nations. Prices of agricultural goods are given by the unit export value of China’s
agricultural products provided by the FAO.
12 The protection rate of industrial goods is measured by the ratio of the price of China’s industrial products
(expressed in yuans) to the unit export value of manufactured products for developing countries, converted into
yuans. The protection rate of agricultural products is measured by the ratio of the purchasing price of agricultural
products in yuans to the unit export value of China’s agricultural products, expressed in dollars and converted13
population receiving only primary education since the same date. Finally, the evolution of the ratio of
urban/rural population receiving only primary education from 1982 to 1988 is obtained by supposing that
it follows the same evolution as the national level in each province. Moreover, China has experienced
tremendous changes in demographic dynamics, due to the single-child-per-household policy, which was
applied differently in urban and rural areas. A divergent evolution of family size (f) in the two zones
may have affected the relative per capita income.
Finally, as many structural changes occurred during the period, we introduce a trend in the
regression to capture them (t)
13.
The income inequality model can be described as follows:
Iit = f(rit, m*rit, r it, wuit, wit, z it, p it, e it, f it, ti, ui, eit)
ui = individual effect
eit = error term
3.2. The main results
We first tested whether our model entailed specific effects with respect to the individual
dimension (within with individual effects). The LM-test statistic of Breusch-Pagan is highly significant
at the 1% level for all regressions. The LR-test, which enables us to test the OLS specification
(without specific effects) against the specification with individual effects, also turns out significant. The
results suggest the presence of specific effects, which leads us to reject the OLS specification without
specific effects. Then, the results of the Hausman-test do not allow us to reject a specification with
fixed effects. The robustness of the model is examined by a Chow test in both the regional and
temporal dimensions, which allows us to detect the eventual structural changes not taken into account
by the model. As the results are not statistically significant, we accept, thus, the hypothesis of
coefficient constancy.
Table 1 presents the results of the regressions relative to the channels of the impact of exchange
rate. First, in order to evaluate whether or not the positive impact of the real depreciation on income
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
into Chinese currency. The exchange rate is the average of the two dollar exchange rates of Renminbi (during the
periods of dual exchange rates) weighted according to the retention rate of exports.14
inequality, due to the higher share of tradable goods produced in urban than in rural zones, may be
tempered by a higher share of tradable goods in household consumption, we regress the ratio of
urban/rural consumer prices on the real exchange rate, its dummy variable and a trend. The results
show that a real depreciation actually leads to a more rapid rise in consumer prices in urban than in
rural areas, in both coastal as well as in inland provinces (equations 1 and 2).
In order to evaluate the effects of the exchange rate on wages, we regress public real wages
and the ratio of urban/rural real per capita wages respectively on the real exchange rate, its dummy
variable and a trend, to see if there is more or less a mechanism of price index pegging. As expected,
the real depreciation has a negative effect on real public wages for inland provinces, but this effect
proves to be positive for coastal provinces (equations 3 and 4). In fact, the wage policies in inland
provinces are much more rigid than in coastal provinces, due to their dominant heavy industry sector
and inward-oriented environment. Moreover, in coastal provinces, where growth is very high, there
might be a contagious effect of the rapid increase rise in private firms’ wages upon civil servants’
wages. Finally, the real exchange rate does not exert a significant effect on urban/rural real per capita
wages (equations 5 and 6).
Then, we regress the ratio of industrial and agricultural protection rates on the relative
international price of these goods, the real exchange rate, its dummy variable and a trend. As expected,
real depreciation has a negative effect on relative protection rates (equations 7 and 8). In other words,
with real depreciation, industrial protection decreases faster than agricultural protection. This
phenomenon is much more pronounced in coastal provinces, due to their more market-oriented
economy.
The econometric results of the income inequality model are presented in Table 2. Several control
variables, which are in some cases only proxies for theoretical variables, appear to have the expected
signs (equation 9). The agricultural household responsibility system exerts a negative effect because of
its favorable impact on rural incomes, as previously evidenced by Lin (1988), Mcmillan et al. (1989)
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
13 As the exchange rate has a trend for most of the period, it could capture an omitted trend.15
and Johnson (1996), who estimated that the shift in the incentive structure induced by the system has
entailed a rise in agricultural productivity ranging from 30% to 50%. The public sector wages, purged
of the impact of exchange rate, as well as the ratio of urban/rural real per capita wages, prove to have
positive signs and thereby contribute to the increase in urban/rural income inequality. The ratio of
international prices (in dollars) of industrial and agricultural goods and the ratio of related protection
coefficients purged of the impact of exchange rate, have the same impact. Education and family size
are surprisingly insignificant (equations 9 and 11). This may be explained by the fact that the evolution
of education inequality between rural and urban zones has not significantly changed over time (World
Bank, 1997, p33), a fact which also applies to the relative urban/rural family size. The significant effect
of the trend means that it effectively captures the structural changes which occurred during this period.
In inland provinces, the real depreciation (appreciation) of the Renminbi contributes to an
increase (decrease) in urban/rural income inequality through a positive effect of the real exchange rate
on the ratio of urban/rural real per capita incomes, while this effect disappears for coastal provinces, as
expected (equation 9). A 10% increase in the real effective exchange rate induces a 0.6% increase in
the income in equality ratio for inland provinces. This implies that the 127% increase in the real
effective exchange rate between 1985 and 1993 led to a 7.6 % increase in the ratio of urban to rural
real per capita income. In other words, according to the estimated Beta coefficients, a 1 standard
deviation change in real exchange rate led to a 0.44 standard deviation change in urban/rural income
inequality over the 1982-1996 period.
Finally, we can measure the relative impact of the various effects of exchange rate variations
on urban/rural real per capita income inequality for the 1982-1996 period. The rise in the urban/rural
consumer price ratio due to real depreciation reduced the positive impact of the real exchange rate on
urban bias by 25 % in inland provinces
14. The impact of the exchange rate on income inequality through
its action on real public wages is estimated to be -0.017 and 0.014 for inland and coastal provinces
respectively, whereas the impact through the ratio of industry/agriculture protection rates is - 0.007 and16
-0.027
15. The regression (12) in Table 2 where the real public wages and the ratio of
industrial/agricultural protection are no longer purged of the impact of real exchange rate variations
confirms that these aggregate secondary effects of exchange rate variations are substantial, since the
elasticity of urban/rural inequality to the real exchange rate changes from 0.06 (equation 9) to 0.09 in
inland provinces and from zero to 0.02 for coastal provinces.
4. Conclusion
The real depreciation of the Chinese currency until 1993 played a crucial role in the opening-up
policy, but it also contributed to the increase in income inequality between urban and rural areas in
inland provinces. So long as income inequality can be considered as detrimental to growth (notably
because inequality generates social frustrations), the appreciation of the exchange rate since 1994 can
be seen as a favorable factor. Of course, this assertion totally overlooks the issue of the relationship
between the real exchange rate, external trade development and economic growth.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 If we regress the ratio of nominal (instead of real) urban and rural income on the real exchange rate, the
coefficient of this last variable is equal to 0.08 (0.06+0.02).
15 We multiply the elasticity of public wages (or the ratio of industry/agriculture rates) to real exchange rate and
the elasticity of urban/rural income inequality to the purged public wages (or the purged ratio of
industry/agriculture rates).17
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Real effective exchange rate of
Renminbi (r) 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.05 0.06 -0.07* -0.06*
Dummy variable  ) * ( r m 0.02 0.01 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.05 -0.01 -0.20*** -0.19***
International terms of trade
industry/agriculture (z) 
-0.74*** -0.66***
Trend 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01* -0.01***
Number of observations 353 317 353 317 353 317 353 317
Adjusted R² 0.66 0.65 0.74 0.72 0.24 0.24 0.69 0.57
Table 2 The determinants of urban/rural per capita real income of China
Ratio of Urban/rural per capita income 1982-96 1985-96 1985-96 1982-96
9 10 11 12
Explanatory variables
Real effective exchange rate of the Renminbi (r) 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.09***
Dummy variable (m*r) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07***
Purged real public per capita wages (wup) 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29***
Real public per capita wages (wu) 0.28***
Ratio of urban/rural real per capita wages (w) 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14***
Percentage of agricultural households adopting the responsibility
system (r)
-0.24*** -0.24***
International industry/agriculture terms of trade (z) 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23***
Purged ratio of industry/agriculture protection rates (pp) 0.10*** 0.08** 0.09***
Ratio of industry/agriculture protection rates (p) 0.10***
Ratio of urban/rural population only receiving primary education (e) -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Rural/ urban family size (f) 0.03
Trend 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Number of observations 353 317 317 353
Adjusted R² 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.64